The internal functioning of the Election Commission of India (ECI) has become a subject of intense debate following reports of significant internal disagreements. According to a report by the Indian Express, Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi have recorded their written objections to the commission's decisions and administrative methods at least 14 times over the past 10 months. This situation has brought the power dynamics between the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and the two Election Commissioners (ECs) into the spotlight. The core of the debate revolves around whether the CEC, currently Gyanesh Kumar, holds the power to unilaterally decide matters or if the two ECs have an equal say in the governance of the country's electoral processes. The objections raised by the commissioners involve critical issues such as the entry of new voters, the removal of names from the voter list, changes to Form-6, and the centralization of the voter database.
The Constitutional and Legal Framework of the ECI
The Election Commission of India is a constitutional body established under Article 324 of the Constitution. The structure of the commission includes a Chief Election Commissioner and a number of other Election Commissioners as determined by the President. In the current three-member configuration, Gyanesh Kumar serves as the CEC, while Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi serve as the Election Commissioners. Although the CEC is designated as the Chairman of the Commission, this title doesn't confer superior voting power or a veto over the other two members. The ECI's official operational guidelines and the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act 2023 establish a framework where all three members have an equal role in decision-making. In this multi-member body, decisions are intended to be reached through a majority vote, ensuring a collective approach to the commission's responsibilities.
The Authority of the Chief Election Commissioner
As the Chairman, the CEC is responsible for presiding over the commission's meetings and coordinating its various activities. However, the 2023 Act explicitly prevents the CEC from exercising absolute authority. Section 18(1) of the 2023 Act mandates that the commission should, as far as possible, conduct its business through unanimous decisions. This requirement for consensus applies to the allocation of work among the CEC and the ECs, as well as the determination of the procedures the commission follows. This legal provision is designed to maintain the commission as a collective entity, preventing a hierarchical structure where the CEC could dictate terms to the other commissioners. The law emphasizes that the distribution of duties and the procedural conduct of the commission must be agreed upon by all members.
The Role and Equal Say of Election Commissioners
The two Election Commissioners are full members of the commission and aren't subordinate to the CEC in terms of decision-making. Their roles encompass a wide range of critical electoral functions, including the preparation and maintenance of voter lists, the conduct of elections, and the oversight of political parties and candidates. The ECI maintains that all commissioners have an equal say in the decision-making process. The 2023 Act further supports this by providing for the collective management of the commission's duties. The administrative reality is that the commission functions as a unified body where the CEC and the two ECs must work together to fulfill their constitutional mandate. The idea that the CEC can simply issue orders for the ECs to follow isn't supported by the legal framework.
Can the CEC Overrule Disagreements?
The question of whether the CEC can overrule the other two commissioners is addressed by Section 18(2) of the 2023 Act. This section provides a clear mechanism for resolving differences of opinion within the commission, while if the CEC and the other Election Commissioners can't reach a unanimous agreement on a particular issue, the matter is decided by the majority opinion. For example, if both Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi agree on a specific course of action that differs from the CEC's view, their majority opinion becomes the official decision of the commission. Similarly, if the CEC and one EC are in agreement while the third member dissents, the majority view prevails. This confirms that the CEC doesn't possess a veto or the power of a final decision-maker, while the CEC leads the commission as its chairman, but every member's vote carries the same weight in the final outcome.
The Nature of the 14 Objections
The 14 written objections recorded by Sandhu and Joshi are significant because they highlight fundamental disagreements on statutory and administrative matters. The report indicates that these objections were raised against decisions such as the inclusion of questions related to the Statistical Integrity Register (SIR) in Form-6. The commissioners argued that Form-6 is governed by statutory rules and any modifications would require an amendment to the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. Commissioner Sandhu reportedly described certain changes as "unauthorized" and "illegal," calling for their removal. Also, concerns were raised regarding the ECINet and the centralization of the voter database in Delhi. The commissioners expressed fears that such centralization could undermine the role of Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) who operate at the ground level. These recorded dissents provide a formal record of internal disagreements, even if the majority decision is ultimately implemented.
Administrative Communication and Internal Friction
The friction within the commission also extended to administrative communications. On 16 and 24 April, commissioners Sandhu and Joshi reportedly wrote to officials stating that any communications issued in the name of the ECI must have the formal approval of the commission. This move was intended to ensure that the collective authority of the commission is respected in all official correspondence. The report suggests that the commissioners were concerned about decisions being communicated without their full consensus or proper authorization. These instances highlight the ongoing struggle to maintain the collective decision-making process as envisioned by the law.
Differences in Removal Protection and Constitutional Status
While the CEC and ECs are equals in decision-making, there is a significant difference in their constitutional protection regarding removal from office. Under Article 324 of the Constitution, the CEC can only be removed from office in a manner similar to a Judge of the Supreme Court, which requires a special majority in both Houses of Parliament and a subsequent Presidential order. However, an Election Commissioner can be removed from office based on the recommendation of the CEC. This disparity in removal protection was noted by PRS in its analysis of the 2023 Act and was also a point of observation by the Supreme Court in 2023. The court mentioned that providing ECs with the same level of protection as the CEC would require a constitutional amendment. So, while they function as equals within the commission's boardroom, their legal security in their positions isn't identical.